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Foreword
The UK Government is planning a ‘levelling up’ White 
Paper for the autumn, so this new research by Les 
Mayhew is very timely. 
Much of the White Paper will be focused on narrowing 
regional inequalities. But will that be enough?  Listening 
to the debate on inequalities, one will be forgiven for 
thinking that “levelling up” is just about pumping 
investment into an area, and hoping that everything 
will be alright.  Sadly, it is not as easy as that. Yes, 
infrastructure - such as new hospitals and schools and 
better transport connectivity - and jobs are important. 
But so also is human capital, and if that capital is 
not up to scratch there will be greater mismatches in 
productivity between rich and poor areas, more ill-health 
and shorter working lives.
This is only part of the story, because the proportion of 
life spent in good health is negatively correlated with 
lifespan to an economically devastating effect. We know, 
for example, that life expectancy varies by up to 12 
years between top and bottom deprivation percentiles. 
For those living in the most deprived areas, it leads to 
shorter working lives, earlier exit from the workforce, 
higher health and welfare spending - and very often also 
to economic hardship.  The sadness is that just throwing 
money at the problem, while welcome, will not cure 
it. Inequalities in society are deeply embedded – they 
have been around for as long as we have been measuring 
them, and probably since the dawn of time. More 
importantly, they have been getting worse, as all the 
latest research suggests. 
Les tackles the problem head-on by analysing the 
fundamental causes of inequalities in a refreshingly 
innovative way, using basic demographic concepts like 
health and life expectancy, and then linking them to 
basic economic variables such as economic activity, GDP, 
public spending and taxes.  By quantifying the link 
between good health, life span and economic output 
in a simple way, this means that we can now say what 
the economic value would be of an increase in healthy 
life expectancy on working lives, and on life expectancy 
itself. Les then uses his findings to test scenarios aimed at 
quantifying the economic value of health improvements. 
In principle, his approach means we can address such 
questions as whether life extensions are affordable 
without improvements in health, the central role of 
productivity in paying for an ageing society, and wider 
questions such as the future of work and remuneration 
in the information age.  Although his approach is still 
experimental, he sets out clearly his findings thus far, 
their implications for policy and also the next stages in 
the research. Les joined the ILC in October last year as 
head of global research, but has had a long association 
with the ILC over many years. We look forward to 
working with him in the next stages of this work, and 
applying the findings and insights in our wider work.
David Sinclair 
Director, International Longevity Centre (ILC)
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Preface
This is the fourth paper by Professor Les Mayhew that 
the CSFI has published. All four have looked at health 
and ageing as they affect UK society and the economy 
– and, indeed, the tough financial choices that the 
government will have to make going forward.
This paper, however, differs in two important ways.
First, it is very much an ‘early harvest’ of work that 
Les is currently undertaking. Indeed, it could be 
seen as a prospectus for a much more comprehensive 
study that (I hope) he will be able to carry out. And, 
second, it is directly addressed to the ‘levelling up’, 
post-Covid agenda to which this particular government 
is committed. Potentially, it gives politicians and 
government officials a new way of looking at the causes 
of inequality – and a metric by which they can assess the 
efficacy of various policy interventions.  
It is also new in two ways. One is that it makes a very 
clear distinction between overall life expectancy, working 
life expectancy and healthy life expectancy – and 
illustrates how they do not move in lockstep, but are 
greatly affected by the relative level of deprivation in the 
various communities of which England is composed. 
(Les looks at 150 English districts for which data is 
available.)  And second, it proposes a hypothetical local 
tax as a way to reflect the degree of local deprivation and 
to predict the impact that government interventions 
might have.
The paper is aimed squarely at policy-makers who will 
have to make tough decisions on health and well-being 
– decisions that go beyond simple promises to boost 
life expectancy. Obviously, I want to thank Les for 
producing the paper – and to urge him to take the work 
further. I also want to thank the Business School at City 
University (soon to be the Bayes School) for its support.
And, I want to thank my colleague, Jane Fuller, who 
worked hard with Les on the paper. That it reads very 
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One of the UK’s great achievements is that people are 
living longer than they did just a few decades ago. But 
an ageing population has its cost: it increases pressure 
on health and social care, on welfare payments and 
on pensions – and hence on taxes. At the same time, 
however, it is recognised that older people can make a 
big contribution to the economy, although poor health 
remains an obstacle to them doing so. The inequalities 
can be seen in different parts of the UK, manifesting 
themselves in shorter working lives, higher healthcare 
costs, higher welfare payments and income poverty. 
At present, there is no simple measure that links health 
on the one hand to economic disadvantage on the 
other – and so to the tax burden that is needed to pay 
for health and welfare services. Nor is there adequate 
understanding of how working lives respond to health 
improvements, or of the efficacy of focusing spending on 
treating the sick versus policies designed to maintain and 
improve health. This paper challenges the conventional 
wisdom by proposing a novel way of thinking about 
inequalities that links health to wealth and to the 
economy. 
We show, for example, that a one-year extension in 
healthy life expectancy would add around 3.4 months to 
working lives and 4.5 months to overall life expectancy – 
and that is could reduce income taxes by 0.6 percentage 
points based on current data and policies. Although early 
results are only indicative, they speak to the simplicity of 
the approach and to its potential applications as the UK 
tries to ‘build back better’ after Covid-19 and to ‘level 
up’ deprived areas. 
We also show that it is generally more efficient to focus 
policy on increasing healthy life expectancy than on 
extending the total life span. The latter would tend 
to shunt more health and care costs to the end of life 
without extending working lives. In principle, these costs 
could be met by, say, increasing the state pension age and 
by higher taxes, but there are diminishing returns and a 
heavy price would have to be paid. Productivity growth, 
long the Achilles’s heel of the UK economy, would help, 
but is not guaranteed and could widen inequalities 
further. 
What is new about the methodology applied in this 
study is the way we measure the scale of this inequality. 
We do this by imagining a situation in which each 
local area is responsible for financing its own public 
services and that the tax base is people’s earnings. In 
other words, we hypothesise that a local tax is levied to 
cover healthcare costs, welfare benefits for those sick and 
unable to work, and state pensions. Areas in good health 
and with high levels of economic activity would require 
CSFI
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lower tax rates to support the sick and elderly; the reverse 
would be true for areas of poor health, lower economic 
activity and an ageing population. 
Differences in these hypothetical tax rates between 
districts provide a summary measure of inequality. 
They also indicate how this might be mitigated by 
policies aimed at improving health and productivity. 
Our approach means that we can quantify the scale 
of disadvantage suffered by any local area, identify 
the causes of that disadvantage and improve decision-
making on what needs to be done to reverse it.  
To do this, a total of 150 districts in England were 
analysed and divided into 27 categories according to 
three ratings – high, medium and low – for each of 
the three key life spans: life expectancy, healthy life 
expectancy and working life expectancy. For the majority 
of districts, average healthy life expectancy falls short 
of the state pension age. Indeed, as noted in a previous 
CSFI report, The Dependency Trap1, economic activity 
rates start to decline from the age of 50 and the trend 
accelerates into old age. 
Applying measures of average earnings and state pension 
and benefit payments, an imputed tax rate can be 
worked out for each district – as if it were making these 
payments itself out of local earnings. These tax rates 
range from 21% to 33% – with the highest rates in the 
districts that would least be able to afford them. This 
both captures the need for redistribution of tax revenues 
and points to the economic advantages of levelling up.
The research also considered the impact of changes in 
healthy life expectancy. For instance, an addition of 
five years to HLE would increase life expectancy by 
1  Mayhew. L.D. (2018) The Dependency Trap – Are we fit enough to face 
the future? Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation (CSFI). Special 
CSFI report in conjunction with the Business School (formerly Cass), City 
University, London. 
nearly two years – but working life by less than one year. 
The latter, relatively modest, effect suggests that other 
measures are also needed, such as an increase in the state 
pension age.
The report urges the government’s new Office for Health 
Promotion2 to support joined-up research that offers 
real solutions. This means working not only with bodies 
that promote improvements to healthy life expectancy 
and longevity, but also with those focusing on raising 
productivity and levels of economic activity as part of 
the ‘levelling up’ agenda. 
2  The new Office for Health Promotion, announced in March 2021, will 
lead national efforts to improve and level up the health of the nation by 
tackling obesity, improving mental health and promoting physical activity. 
It will sit within the Department of Health and Social Care.
1 Mayhew. L.D. (2018) The Dependency Trap – Are we fit enough to face the future? Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation (CSFI). Special CSFI report 
in conjunction with the Business School (formerly Cass), City University, London. 
2 The new Office for Health Promotion, announced in March 2021, will lead national efforts to improve and level up the health of the nation by tackling 
obesity, improving mental health and promoting physical activity. It will sit within the Department of Health and Social Care.
CSFI
CSFI  –  73 Leadenhall Market, London EC3V 1LT  –  Tel: 020 7621 1056  –  E-mail: info@csfi.org  –  Web: www.csfi.org 3
Introduction
Successive studies have shown that inequalities are deeply 
embedded in the UK economy. Even though closing the 
gap, or ‘levelling up’, is now high on the political agenda, 
these inequalities manifest themselves in different ways – 
through educational attainment, incomes, health, wealth 
and so on. One particularly telling indicator is the gulf 
in life expectancy of 12 years between the top 1% of the 
population, who live in the least deprived districts, and 
those in the bottom 1%, who live in the most deprived.3 
How to count the cost of inequality is more complicated 
than simply cherry-picking a few statistics on why some 
areas perform better or worse. Is it due to poor health, 
economic deprivation or other factors? This paper 
offers more meaningful measurements in an inclusive 
framework that builds on actual evidence.
Why is this important? In 2018, the Secretary of State 
for Health and Social Care stated an ambition to increase 
healthy life expectancy (HLE) in England by at least 
five years by 2035, while also reducing the gap in life 
expectancy between the richest and the poorest groups. 
A delay in providing the details is not surprising given 
the intervention of Covid-19; however, the pandemic 
also highlighted public health inequalities. 
Others have added their voice. For example, the All 
Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on longevity, in 
a report published in April 20214, asserts that the UK 
has the worst health outcomes in Europe and that this 
is a drag on economic growth. It argues for a political 
commitment to level up health and says that “whatever 
the evidence shows” needs to be done should be done. 
The newly established Office for Health Promotion is 
expected to play a major role in this. 
3 Mayhew, L. , G. Harper, G. and A.M. Villegas (2020)  An investigation 
into the impact of deprivation on demographic inequalities in 
adults , Annals of Actuarial Science, 14, pp. 358–383 doi:10.1017/
S1748499520000068
4 All Party Parliamentary Group for Longevity. Levelling Up Health (April, 
2021). 
3 Mayhew, L. , G. Harper, G. and A.M. Villegas (2020)  An investigation into the impact of deprivation on demographic inequalities in adults , Annals of 
Actuarial Science, 14, pp. 358–383 doi:10.1017/S17484995200000682 
4 All Party Parliamentary Group for Longevity. Levelling Up Health (April, 2021). 
5 Keeley, B. (2015) Income Inequality-The gap between rich and poor. OECD
6 Piketty, T. (2013). Le Capital au XXIe siècle (Paris: Seuil).
We can be sure that focusing on improving HLE will 
make a positive difference. People would be able to work 
and save for longer, and health services would be under 
less pressure. What is missing is the interaction between 
HLE, economic activity and income levels, and how to 
put a value on the related causes of disadvantage – or 
on the benefits of tackling them. This risks repeating 
the mistake of designing policy with too narrow a focus. 
The crucial question is how to deliver this ambition in a 
more integrated way.
An unhelpful trend is that income inequalities are firmly 
entrenched and, indeed, have increased slightly in recent 
years. There has long been evidence of the downward 
trend in labour’s share of GDP, with globalisation 
and technological change as the oft-cited causes (e.g. 
OECD, 20155). The higher share accruing to capital 
has been associated with higher income inequality - and 
by extension with inequality of health outcomes (e.g. 
Thomas Piketty 20136). 
Inequality in sharing the benefits of GDP growth has 
affected geographic areas and socio-economic groups 
differently. We can see this, for example, among the 
large number of adults aged over 50 but yet to reach 
state pension age who are economically inactive through 
redundancy, long-term sickness or disability, or as a 
result of skill gaps. Such disadvantages are felt most 
acutely in ‘left behind’ areas – especially where wages 
and benefits are the main sources of income. 
In this paper, we introduce a new way of measuring 
the scale of this disadvantage. We imagine a situation 
in which each local area is responsible for financing its 
own public services out of taxes, and that the tax base 
5 Keeley, B. (2015) Income Inequality-The gap between rich and poor. 
OECD
6 Piketty, T. (2013). Le Capital au XXIe siècle (Paris: Seuil).
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is local people’s earnings. A local tax would be levied to 
cover healthcare costs, welfare benefits for those sick and 
unable to work, and state pensions. Clearly, areas where 
the general level of health is good and where economic 
activity levels are higher would require lower tax rates to 
support the sick and elderly. Equally, the reverse would 
be true for areas of poor health, lower economic activity 
and an ageing population.
The differences in these hypothetical tax rates are an 
important proxy for the underlying financial pressures 
on public services and pensions, and for the inequality 
between areas. It is, we believe, the first time anyone has 
attempted to produce this kind of metric.
Putting a value on longevity and health
It might seem cold-blooded to put a price on poor 
health, rather than simply to call for more spending on 
services. But by measuring the financial impact of poor 
health on welfare payments, pensions and earnings, 
policy-makers can turn their attention to preventative 
action, as well as reacting more effectively to immediate 
needs. To give an illustration, higher labour participation 
generates more output, more consumption and a larger 
tax base, but only if the workforce is in good health. In 
an ageing population, this is challenging since declining 
health limits participation rates and has a negative effect 
on healthcare costs and welfare payments. 
We can think of the cost of inequality as the required 
size of the tax base 7 to fund these essential services. If 
this were funded locally, inequality would be exacerbated 
by the adverse impact of high taxation on living 
standards. Equally, there would be a financial, as well as 
social, ‘dividend’ if inequalities could be eliminated and 
the savings re-invested. The analytical approach used for 
this study estimates what the hypothetical local tax rates 
would need to be to pay for pensions, disability benefits 
and healthcare based on the earnings of a representative 
population over its life course. To summarise, there are 
7 Modelled tax rates are an indicator of this process but not the solution. 
This is because economies rely on other sources of income such as rents 
and dividends accruing to landlords, business owners and ordinary savers. 
Although wealth creation is not just about jobs, jobs sustain families and 
communities especially in the early stages of the life cycle.
four main arguments for this approach: 
•	 Identifying the main contributors to the cost 
of inequality provides a rigorous basis for the 
‘levelling up’ agenda.
•	 Human capital is a primary driver of well-being 
and wealth, and so priority should be given to 
promoting productivity, healthy behaviour and 
investment in education and skills.  
•	 Reducing the wealth gap between different areas 
of the UK should reverse the phenomenon of 
people, resources and investment gravitating to 
more affluent areas.
•	 Assuming one can establish a direct relationship 
between output and health, the use of a tax metric 
provides a better basis for redistribution. 
An underlying assumption is that people are 
independent actors who engage with and react to the 
environment in which they live and work. In our model, 
we make health the focus of attention. For example, we 
know that ill health correlates with adverse lifestyles, 
shorter healthy life expectancy, higher mortality and 
shorter working lives. Structural economic changes, such 
as the decline in manufacturing, have contributed to ill 
health through redundancy, long-term unemployment 
and income loss. In the new digital economy, the same 
might occur in sectors such as retail, as shopping habits 
change and jobs are automated. 
Figure 1 shows the hypothesised interactions between 
life, health and working life expectancy. If healthy life 
expectancy is improved, we would expect this to feed 
through into both longer life expectancy and longer 
working lives. If it falls, we would expect the opposite to 
happen. 
7 Modelled tax rates are an indicator of this process but not the solution. This is because economies rely on other sources of income such as rents and dividends 
accruing to landlords, business owners and ordinary savers. Although wealth creation is not just about jobs, jobs sustain families and communities especially 
in the early stages of the life cycle.
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It is important to remember that increases in life 
expectancy are not always matched by health 
improvement. Indeed, there is evidence that the 
gap between overall life expectancy and healthy life 








-ve -ve  
Figure 1: Impact (positive or negative) of rising or falling healthy life expectancy on life expectancy and 
working life expectancy
providing healthcare, social care and financial support 
to the elderly, relative to the rest of the population, 
will increase. Furthermore, economic resources will be 
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Chapter 1: 
Life, health and working lives defined 
Life expectancy (LE) is defined as the number of years 
a person is expected to live, and is usually measured 
at birth. However, since we are interested in working 
lives, it is more appropriate for us to use a starting age 
of 20. Healthy life expectancy (HLE) is defined as 
the number of remaining years that an individual can 
expect to have in “very good” or “generally good” health. 
HLE is strongly correlated with the number of years 
an individual can expect to live without a long-term 
limiting illness. Although it is theoretically possible for 
HLE and LE to be the same, in practice most people die 
after a long or short illness. The gap between LE and 
HLE is the number of years spent in greater or lesser ill 
health at the end of life.
Working life expectancy (WLE) is the expected number 
of years spent being economically active between 
entering work and retirement. If we assume, for the sake 
of argument, a post-education starting age of 20 with 
a conventional end point of 65, then a person who is 
active for the whole of that period has a working life of 
45 years. For many, the age of 65 corresponded with the 
UK’s state pension age (SPA), but with the raising of 
the SPA to 66 (and further increases planned), this no 
longer applies. Because of the scrapping of the default 
retirement age, SPA is increasingly redundant as a proxy 
for retirement age although it remains a reference point 
for welfare and other administrative purposes. 
There are practical reasons why any single ‘retirement’ 
age should be treated with caution. Labour force data 
shows that economic activity reaches a maximum of 
between 80% and 90% between the ages of 20 and 55. 
Activity rates slowly decline from about age 50 – in other 
words, long before 65 – for reasons such as poor health, 
redundancy and age discrimination in staff recruitment 
and retention. This trend continues into old age and 
accelerates, so that that the availability of potential 
workers falls sharply beyond age 70.8 To give an example, 
suppose the average activity rate between 20 and 65 is 
0.8, this would equate to 0.8 x 45, or an average 36-year 
working life in the steady state. In theory, labour market 
data could be extended to whole life with some small 
tweaks to current labour market statistics, but the extra 
working years generated post-65 would be quite small in 
this numerical example owing to the much lower activity 
rates in old age.
2.1 A worked example
It will be recalled that we calculate LE, HLE and WLE 
from age 20; therefore, to determine the expected ages 
of death, the onset of ill health or when work ceases, 
we need to add 20 years to our data. We call the new 
figure ‘life span’ or ‘expected age of death’, which is 
simply LE at age 20 plus 20 years. Its main purpose is to 
enable us to present results in chronological age, rather 
than in terms of future years of life. Thus, if LE at age 
20 is 60 years then the expected age of death would be 
80; if HLE at 20 is 50 years, then the expected age at 
which poor health kicks in would be 70; if WLE is 40 
years then the expected age when a person ceases to be 
economically active is 60.
To analyse local variations in LE, HLE and WLE, 
we need a dataset that covers each domain in every 
local authority area in England, without overlap. 
8  Mayhew, L.D. (2018) The Dependency Trap – Are we fit enough to face 
the future? Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation (CSFI). Special 
CSFI report in conjunction with the Business School (formerly Cass), City 
University, London. 
8 Mayhew, L.D. (2018) The Dependency Trap – Are we fit enough to face the future? Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation (CSFI). Special CSFI report 
in conjunction with the Business School (formerly Cass), City University, London. 
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Fortunately, there is such a set, made up of unitary 
authorities, metropolitan boroughs, London boroughs 
and counties.9 In total, our list comprises 150 districts 
covering the whole of England. Extending this to the rest 
of the UK would be an obvious next step in the research. 
While health data and labour market statistics are not 
always consistent between geographic areas, the data is 
good enough to produce meaningful results.
Table 1 splits districts into five-percentile steps, from 
districts with the shortest life span to those with the 
longest. For illustrative purposes, the analysis is based on 
males, but it would be straightforward to include females 
in further work.  It shows:
•	 A widening gap in life, health and work spans 
between the lowest 5% of districts and the 95th 
percentile. The differences are indicative of shorter 
working lives and higher health costs over the life 
course in the lowest percentiles.
9   ONS gives a 9 character code to each every administrative area. In our 
cases they are pre-fixed E06, E08, E09 and E10 using the national GSS 
system. For example, Portsmouth is  E06000044,  Liverpool E08000012,  
Islington E09000019 and E10000019 Lincolnshire
•	 Variations within percentiles are also wide. For 
example, there is a 19.9-year gap between life and 
health spans in the lowest 5% compared with a 
13-year gap in the 95th percentile. This means that 
only 74% of lifespan is spent in good health in the 
former, compared with 85% in the latter.
•	 More years are spent being economically inactive 
in the bottom 5% than in the 95th percentile, even 
though life span is lower in the former. In the 5th 
percentile, 96% of a much lower health span is spent 
in work compared with 88% in the 95th percentile, 
indicating a longer period of healthy retirement for 
the latter.
 
9 ONS gives a nine character code to each every administrative area. In our cases they are pre-fixed E06, E08, E09 and E10 using the national GSS system. For 
example, Portsmouth is  E06000044,  Liverpool E08000012,  Islington E09000019 and E10000019 Lincolnshire
Tabl  1: LE, HLE and WL  by percentile of districts ranging from the 5th percentile (lowest) to the 95th 
percentile (highest) (Note: bold figures are the median lower and upper quartile values)  
Percentile
Indicator 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 0.95
A Life span (yrs) 76.7 77.2 78.0 79.2 80.3 81.2 81.6
B Health span (yrs) 56.9 58.0 59.8 62.9 65.4 67.9 68.6
C Work span (yrs) 54.5 55.1 56.3 57.6 58.7 59.7 60.1
A-B Life-health (yrs) 19.9 19.1 18.2 16.3 15.0 13.3 13.0
A-C Life-work (yrs) 22.3 22.1 21.7 21.5 21.6 21.5 21.5
B-C Health-work (yrs) 2.4 3.0 3.5 5.3 6.7 8.2 8.5
B/A Health/Life % 74 75 77 79 81 84 84
C/A Work/Life % 71 71 72 73 73 73 74
C/B Work/Health % 96 95 94 92 90 88 88
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There are other important implications that can be 
drawn from this table. For example, it is reasonable to 
conclude the following:
•	 A widening gap between health and life expectancy 
is bad for the economy because it implies that more 
years of life are spent in ill health and economic 
inactivity, with negative implications for health, 
social care and welfare costs.
•	 Work span is lowest in districts with the shortest 
health spans, and is always less than healthy life 
span. The gap tends towards zero in the lowest 
percentiles, but in the highest percentile it is 8.5 
years and trending higher. We may infer that 
short healthy life spans are a key obstacle to longer 
working lives.  
•	 Increasing the number of years spent in good health 
following exit from the labour market is good for the 
economy because healthy people consume more and 
are available for other activities, such as volunteering 
and providing care within the family. They also 
consume less in benefits and NHS resources.
These patterns are also borne out, virtually without 
exception, if we drill down to individual local authority 
level. 
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Chapter 2: 
Drilling down to district level 
Which combinations of life, health and work span are 
most advantageous? If we knew this we should be able 
to devise policies that accentuate positive rather than 
negative outcomes. For example, policies that require 
people to spend their whole lives working would be 
hugely unpopular. Policies that prioritise life span over 
health span would bankrupt the healthcare system 
by subsidising poor health – a sensitive issue, but one 
that puts a clear value on the cost of poor health to 
the economy. Similarly, policies that do not look after 
the welfare of workers would be disastrous for the 
economy. If it were possible to show that the most 
successful districts are also the healthiest, methods could 
be developed to weight life, health and work spans to 
promote the most favourable outcomes for society. 
One mechanism is needed to compare districts based 
on LE, HLE and WLE, and a second to put a value 
on inequalities. Since there are 150 districts in our 
database, it makes sense to group like with like. How 
we do this is explained below. In the introduction, we 
posed the hypothetical question of what tax rates would 
be required if each district (or group of districts) were 
held responsible for its own health, welfare and pension 
costs. Currently, these costs come in different forms 
and are typically contained in the budgets of different 
government departments. They are usually demand-led 
rather than capped. As a result, some districts will receive 
higher levels of funding than others, but there is no 
accessible data for the total value of these transfers.
We can, however, make a few simplifying assumptions.
To keep it simple, we include the cost of providing 
healthcare, state pension costs and disability benefits 
in our calculations, but ignore other areas of public 
expenditure such as education and training and defence. 
As a further simplification, we also levy our hypothetical 
tax solely on income, although this could be changed 
to include other taxable revenue streams in future 
applications. An obvious criticism of this approach is 
that it does not take into account the value of other 
outputs, such as profits and rents, and non-remunerated 
activities such as care and volunteering. However, our 
aim is more limited in this early stage of the research – it 
is to understand a set of financial effects based on a few 
important factors, so that we can isolate the economic 
value of healthy ageing and working longer.
Although we can treat each district separately, in this 
paper we have chosen to put each district into sub-
groups. This simplifies the presentation of the results 
and enables us to observe patterns and trends. We assign 
to each district a code according to whether life, healthy 
life or working life expectancy is high (H), medium 
(M) or low (L) using quartile cut-off values (these are 
emboldened in Table 1). For example, a district with the 
code ‘HML’ has a life span in the top quartile (>80.3 
years), health span between the 25th and 75th percentile 
(between 59.8 and 65.4 years) and work expectancy in 
the bottom quartile (<56.3 years from birth, or <36.3 
years from age 20). A district with the code ‘LLL’ would 
be among the most deprived, in all three senses, and one 
with ‘HHH’ among the most advantaged. With three 
outcomes per category, ‘H’ ‘M’ and’ L’, there are 27 
different types of area. 
The treatment of taxation is more complicated. Take the 
state pension, which is not directly affected by a person’s 
health, employment status or life expectancy. A PAYG 
system, it is paid for out of general taxation and is in 
continuous payment until death, so the age at which 
it is set will affect the results. The general relationship 
between activity rates, total income and taxes is shown in 
Figure 2. The more economically active the population, 
the greater its productivity in the form of higher wages 
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and higher output. Higher output, in turn, increases the 
tax base to pay for healthcare, welfare and pensions, and 







Figure 2: The positive/negative relationship between activity rates, output and taxes
The next step is to put values on each of the variables 
in the framework in order to estimate outcomes in tax 
terms. A person could be in good health or bad, pre- or 
post-SPA, in work or not. It is known that health costs 
rise significantly in old age, so we approximate this by 
assuming different rates of expenditure depending on 
whether someone is aged above or below the SPA (the 
model uses the conventional age of 65). This seems 
reasonable since pension age is determined by a range 
of factors averaged out over the population, the costs of 
which vary by health and disability as well as by age. 
We then split remaining life into the following quantities 
expressed in this identity:
Expected remaining life 
= 
Expected healthy working life + Expected unhealthy working life 
+ Expected healthy retired life + Expected unhealthy retired life
The next step is to attach financial quantities to each 
element of the relationship. Lifetime income is defined 
as being equal to working life expectancy times average 
earnings. In the same way we can calculate lifetime adult 
healthcare costs and the cost of disability benefits using 
the expected number of years in ill health (i.e. life span 
minus health span) multiplied by the going rates for 
each cost category. We can also calculate a representative 
local, hypothetical tax rate for an individual in any of 
our districts over his or her life (or remaining life span), 
as follows: 
would, of course, have the reverse effect – fewer goods 
and services, and higher taxes. 
Positive Negative
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Tax rate = lifetime consumption of health, welfare and pensions ÷ lifetime earnings
Where
1. Lifetime earnings (output) = average earnings x work span
2. State pension received = (life span-SPA) x average value of state pension
3. In-work disability benefits received = (SPA-years spent in good health from age 20) x average 
in-work disability benefit rate
4. Post-SPA disability benefits received = (life span-SPA-healthy  years post SPA) x average 
post-SPA  disability benefit rate
5. Healthcare costs pre-SPA from age 20 = years spent in poor health  x  average health costs 
per annum
6. Healthcare costs post SPA = years spent in poor health to the end of life
For long periods, the representative tax rate is likely to 
be fairly stable. Assuming a broadly constant number of 
births and deaths, the tax rate for the population will be 
the same as for the representative individual at any point 
in time. We exploit this result later when we link output 
to GDP and productivity. 
Most of these definitions are easy to comprehend. State 
pension age was set at 65 in the base case, its value pre-
December 2018, but it is a parameter that can be varied 
to show the effects not only of changes in health and life 
span but also taxes. 
The final step is to insert values for each parameter 
such as average earnings. These values are summarised 
in Table 3 below. They are assumed for the purposes 
of illustration but are consistent with actual UK 
averages. Note that in further research these would be 
disaggregated by district – a step that is feasible but 
involves a large amount of prior work to assemble the 
data.
Table 2: Values of each variable used in the 
illustrative case
Variable Value
SPA (state pension age) 65 years
Adult working life (start age) 20 years




Working age disability benefits 10.0
Disability benefits post-SPA 5.0
Health care costs pre-SPA 1.0
Health care costs post- SPA 2.5
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Chapter 3: 
Results
The results are set out in Table 3. This table allocates 
each district to one of the 27 district types using the H, 
M and L convention. Each row includes the number 
of districts allocated to each category and the imputed 
tax rate, based on the methodology set out above. A 
final column provides examples of districts allocated 
to particular categories. The most common categories 
are HHH, MMM and LLL, accounting for 42% of the 
districts analysed. The HHH category mostly includes 
districts such as Wokingham, Bromley and Oxfordshire 
in the wealthier south-east of England. The MMM 
category includes districts such as Leeds, Medway, 
Greenwich and Cornwall, and is more spread out. The 
bottom row gives examples of the 18 districts in the 
LLL category, including Manchester, Birmingham and 
Liverpool. A full list can be seen in the Appendix.
Some of the least common combinations may indicate 
special circumstances. An example is MML with 
medium life and health spans but a low work span. This 
includes districts such as Bournemouth, Brighton and 
the Isle of Wight, which are holiday destinations with 
seasonal work. If the labour market were more robust, 
would that improve health and life spans? Another 
interesting category is HHL for which there is only 
one example – Kensington and Chelsea, the richest 
borough in the country with well above average levels 
of economic inactivity. Is that because it is a popular 
destination for the wealthy retired? Or is there an above 
average proportion of the population living on rents and 
dividends? Or is the average resident simply able to retire 
early? 
Just as intriguing are the eight null categories for which 
there are no identifiable districts. These have unusual 
combinations, such as high health span coupled with a 
low life span (or vice versa), cases with two ‘L’s and an 
‘H’ such as rows 9, 21 and 25 and so on. These cases 
signify, for example, the incompatibility of having long 
life expectancy coupled with poor health and shorter 
work spans. In other words, a person with low health 
expectancy will tend to have a low or medium life span 
and vice versa. If we test the hypothesis that work and 
health spans are correlated, we find this to be highly 
statistically significant (p<0.001), vindicating the theory 
that work is good for health and that health is good for 
work – obvious perhaps, but good to see it confirmed in 
the data.
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Table 3: Districts ranked on life, health and work span








1 HHH 14 23.0 Wokingham, Bromley, Oxfordshire, Windsor and Maidenhead
2 HMH 6 25.9 Wiltshire, Ealing, Sutton, Hertfordshire
3 HLH 0 n.a. Null category
4 HHM 8 24.2 Surrey, Richmond upon Thames, Solihull, North Yorkshire, Poole
5 HMM 6 26.7 Suffolk, Leicestershire, Redbridge
6 HLM 0 n.a. Null category
7 HHL 1 29.7 Kensington and Chelsea
8 HML 3 30.4 Solihull, Camden, Westminster
9 HLL 0 n.a. Null category
10 MHH 7 22.5 Northamptonshire, Essex, Warrington
11 MMH 8 24.7 Swindon, Slough , Shropshire, Trafford
12 MLH 2 30.2 Tower Hamlets, Lambeth
13 MHM 8 23.4 York, Reading, Cheshire East
14 MMM 31 25.8 Leeds, Medway, Calderdale, Greenwich, Cornwall
15 MLM 6 29.2 Telford, Bristol, Plymouth, Sheffield
16 MHL 0 n.a. Null category
17 MML 9 28 Bournemouth, Brighton, Isle of Wight, Sefton, Coventry
18 MLL 3 32 Durham, Redcar and Cleveland, Hackney
19 LHH 0 n.a. Null category
20 LMH 1 25.6 Derby
21 LLH 0 n.a. Null category
22 LHM 0 n.a. Null category
23 LMM 6 25.8 Darlington Bury, Bradford
24 LLM 9 29.0 Salford, Newcastle, Doncaster, Barnsley, Barking and Dagenham
25 LHL 0 n.a. Null category
26 LML 4 26.7 Stoke, Portsmouth, Wirral
27 LLL 18 30.0 Hartlepool, Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham, Nottingham
Total 150 26
Note a: Letter order is life, and then health followed by work expectancy; note b, see also next section
Turning to the imputed tax rates in the next column, 
we see that these range from 22.5% to 30.4% with an 
all-district average of 26%10. Areas taxed at higher rates 
are effectively paying the price for poor health and work 
spans relative to other areas. For example, towns and 
10 At the individual district level the rates range from 20.7% in West 
Berkshire to  33.2% in Tower Hamlets
cities such as Hartlepool, Birmingham and Manchester 
in the LLL category have tax rates at the high end of the 
range while those at the head of the table in the HHH 
category have the lowest tax rates. Reported tax rates 
are based on the average of rates for individual districts 
10 At the individual district level the rates range from 21.3% in Warrington (MHH) to  33.7% in Tower Hamlets (LLL)
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in each sub-group and so may not follow in exact rank 
order. This is usually due to that fact that there may 
be only a small number of districts in any particular 
Figure 3: Map of England showing imputed tax rates by district
The map in figure 3 shows the tax rates by individual 
district: the darker the colour, the higher the 
hypothetical tax rate applying. The values range from 
21-22% (cream) to 33-34% (dark green). Prominent 
clusters of imputed high tax rates are the north-east 
(cells F3 to H3), north-west (E5 to F6), West and South 
Yorkshire (G6 to H6), Nottinghamshire (H6 to H7), 
West Midlands (F8 to G8), Hull (I5), Isle of Wight (G12 
to H12) and parts of central and east London (see map 
inset). There are also sporadic clusters elsewhere such as 
Plymouth (C13), Telford (F8) and Stoke-on-Trent (F7). 
For the most part, these tend to be in or near urban 
areas, though sometimes they are on the coast. If it were 
available, more granular data would be able to pinpoint 
category. Derby, for example, with a tax rate of 25.6% is 
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Figure 4: Examples comparing individual districts based on work, health and life-span. The 
hatched horizontal line shows state pension age.
sub-districts better. But, in general, the map gives a good 
picture of deprivation. 
Figure 4 shows six individual districts from four 
categories – three in the LLL group, and one each from 
MMM, HHM and HHH. It shows average periods 
spent by inhabitants in each state – working lives, 
inactive healthy years and unhealthy years. (A hatched 
line from left to right shows the base pension age of 
65.) The chart shows, for example, in which districts 
inhabitants are more likely to reach pension age in 
good health (Windsor and Maidenhead and Richmond 
upon Thames), and in which they are not (i.e. the 
rest). In all cases, the average age at which economic 
activity ceases is lower than the SPA – and, in the case 
of Hartlepool, there is hardly any difference between 
health and work span. 
To summarise, characterising districts on this basis is 
a powerful way of representing inequalities. This is 
important for applications in which it would be handy 
to have such a measure to compare with a dashboard of 
other outcomes. One common measure for capturing 
inequality is the standard deviation, which is a measure 
of dispersion relative to the mean: high value signifies 
greater inequality and low value the opposite. In our 
illustration, the mean is 26% and the standard deviation 
is +/- 3%. If tax rates are distributed normally – which 
approximately they are – it means that 68% of all values 
fall within one standard deviation of the mean – in 
this case 26% +/- 3% i.e. between 23% and 29%. This 
method is used in a later illustration. 
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Chapter 4: 
Effects of changes in LE, HLE and 
WLE on public expenditure and GDP
There are several ways to use this analytical framework. 
Broadly, these entail investigating changes in LE, HLE 
and WLE and their impact on the imputed tax rate, 
productivity and the cost of providing pensions and 
welfare. How will tax rates alter if any or all of these 
variables change? The framework makes this easy to 
calculate. Take the impact of a future rise in longevity 
on tax rates. In this case (and with no other changes), we 
would expect taxes to increase to pay for pensions and 
higher spending on health and disability benefits. This 
is because the years spent in ill health would increase, 
causing higher health and welfare payments, unless there 
was a compensating improvement in health span.
Mitigating steps from the Exchequer to avoid tax 
increases could include a reduction in the value 
of pensions or benefits, or an increase in the SPA. 
Regression analysis based on the 150 English districts 
shows that the impact of a two-year increase in life 
expectancy with no other changes would increase the 
average tax rate from 26% to 29%. It would be possible 
to lower that by increasing the SPA by a whopping seven 
years, or by reducing the average state pension from 
around £8,000 to £6,000 a year, or by some combination 
of the two. This example shows that policies aimed only 
at extending life without extending health are likely to be 
expensive and counterproductive – as well as unpopular.
It is true that increases in life expectancy have faltered 
in recent years, and that immediate prospects for 
further increases have been negatively affected by the 
Covid pandemic. However, a two-year increase in life 
expectancy over the next 15 years is a reasonable working 
assumption based on past performance. (It is possible 
that the death toll from Covid 19 may have altered the 
relationship between LE and HLE, but it is too early to 
tell from the data.) Clearly, the policy goal of improving 
HLE by five years speaks directly to the issues addressed 
in this paper, but current policy does not appear to 
build from an empirical base. New policies are needed 
that explicitly draw the link between health, work and 
economic growth.
As long as rises in life expectancy are accompanied by an 
increase in HLE, prospects are much better – especially if 
they create headroom for longer working lives. Empirical 
evidence suggests that a one-year increase in HLE would 
translate, on average, into an approximate 4.5 month 
increase in LE. A one-year rise in HLE would, in turn, 
generate an increase in WLE of roughly 3.4 months. To 
achieve the government’s five-year aim would be a bigger 
stretch; it would translate into an approximate 23-month 
increase in life expectancy and an approximate 17-month 
increase in WLE, based on current labour market and 
economic activity data. 
Table 4 shows the estimated effect on life and work span, 
taxes and inequality, contingent on changes to health 
expectancy. The scenarios show the effect of a change in 
HLE ranging from -2 to +5 years, with no other changes 
to framework parameters (such as pension age, health 
costs or welfare payments). Given an HLE baseline of 
62.7 years, the results show that life span increases as 
expected, but by less than the rise in HLE. WLE also 
increases, but by less than LE. The net effect is for tax 
rates to fall, but only slightly. Inequalities are reduced less 
than taxes, suggesting that improving general levels of 
health may require more targeted measures in individual 
districts.  
The impact on taxes would be considerably greater 
if there were accompanying changes in the SPA.  For 
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example, assume that the improvements in HLE in 
Table 3 were matched by increases in the SPA. A one-
year improvement in HLE, along with a one-year 
increase in the SPA, would reduce the tax rate to 25.3%, 
a three-year improvement to 23.0% and a five-year 
improvement to 20.8%. Healthcare costs are predicted 
to fall pre-SPA, but increase post-SPA as more health 
costs are shunted forward and re-deployed as end-of-life 
care. That said, the full benefits of increases in HLE are 
not all measurable in fiscal terms – healthy, economically 
inactive older people are more likely to engage in 
voluntary work and social activities as well as spend more 
on consumption. That needs to be borne in mind.
Table 4: Illustrative examples of changes in life and work span, tax rates and inequalities from general 
increases in HLE based on figures from birth 
Change in 
HLE at age 
20 (years) 









+/- %LE HLE WLE
-2 78.4 60.7 57.1 -0.8 -0.4 27.67 3.04
-1 78.8 61.7 57.3 -0.4 -0.2 27.03 2.98
Baseline 79.2 62.7 57.5 0.0 0.0 26.42 2.90
1 79.6 63.7 57.7 0.4 0.2 25.86 2.80
2 79.9 64.7 57.9 0.8 0.4 25.35 2.69
3 80.3 65.7 58.0 1.1 0.6 24.88 2.59
4 80.7 66.7 58.2 1.5 0.7 24.44 2.49
5 81.1 67.7 58.4 1.9 0.9 24.04 2.40
5.1 Economic activity, 
productivity and GDP
We have seen that a rise in HLE tends, on its own, 
to have only a modest effect on work span and, 
therefore, on tax rates, without accompanying fiscal 
measures (such as increasing the SPA), which would 
reduce pension costs and taxes by greater amounts. 
For increases in HLE to have a more substantial effect, 
especially on output, there would need to be incentives 
to convert more of the extra healthy years into work. 
Sluggish productivity growth and early retirement have 
long been seen as the Achilles’s heel of the UK economy 
and are a priority for review. An increase in HLE can 
be viewed as a kind of enabler to capture the higher 
productivity potential of experienced older people who 
would like to work for longer. 
The same sort of analysis can be applied to GDP – 
defined as the final value of the goods and services 
produced during a specified period of time, normally   
a year. 
The GDP growth rate is an important summary measure 
of how well an economy is performing. It can be split 
into two components – one generated by earnings and 
the other representing income generated by profits, 
dividends and rents. Assuming GDP is represented only 
by wages and salaries, we have the further identity:
GDP= Proportion of adults in work x average earnings x adult population 
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The first term on the right is another way of expressing 
work span and equates to levels of economic activity; 
the second term is a measure of productivity; and the 
third term is related to life expectancy in a steady state 
population. For GDP to increase, one or more terms 
to the right must also increase – for example, a 10% 
increase in productivity without any other changes 
would raise GDP by 10%. The same applies to increases 
in the proportion of the population in work and in the 
size of the adult population.
Tax rate = Total cost of health, welfare and pensions ÷ total value of output
GDP per capita is a measure of economic well-being and 
is found by dividing both sides of the equation by the 
adult population. It implies that the population becomes 
better off the higher the proportion of adults that are in 
work and the higher productivity is. This is a gross figure 
before taxes are levied, and the imputed tax rates rise 
with the cost of welfare, healthcare and pensions. The 
tax rate is determined as follows: 
The relationship is, therefore, one in which output per 
capita depends on work span and productivity, but in 
which net earnings depend on the cost of healthcare, 
welfare and pensions – all of which are met through 
taxes as set out above.  
Putting the above into context, assume that two thirds 
of adult life is spent in work and that annual earnings 
are £25,000, plus 20% employer’s social contributions. 
With an adult population of 50m people this produces 
a reasonably accurate value of the share of labour in UK 
GDP of around £1 trillion. The second component 
of GDP, based on profits, dividends and rents, has 
remained relatively steady since 2000 at around 50%, 
which implies a total GDP of £2 trillion, close to the 
2020 value of £2.1 trillion according to the ONS. This 
correspondence means that our demographic accounting 
framework can be considered reasonably realistic. The 
key point is that by making each local area accountable 
for its own taxes, we are now able to shine a spotlight on 
the cost of inequality.
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Conclusions
There is intense interest in tackling the scourge of 
inequality in society and closing the gap between richest 
and poorest areas in terms of income, health, housing, 
education and job prospects. It is increasingly accepted 
that narrowing the current discrepancy in healthy life 
expectancy is a necessary step forward. This is a tough 
challenge and, if anything, the gaps are growing wider. 
At the moment, all these considerations – work, health, 
pensions and welfare – subsist in different policy silos. 
Thus, it is hard to calculate the effect of one on another. 
For example, what would be the economic value of 
a one-year increase in HLE on GDP versus a one-
year increase in LE? Would this increase or decrease 
inequalities?  
The aim of this research has been to put a price on 
inequality and an economic value on good health. This 
has two implications – the first is that good health is 
a precondition for a longer working life and healthy 
retirement, and the second is that good health reduces 
the cost of services such as health and social care. If each 
district is treated as autonomous and responsible for 
funding its own health, welfare and pension provision, 
we can quantify these effects explicitly. Those districts 
with the fewest working years would pay most taxes 
and those with the best health and longest working lives 
the least. Based on simple assumptions we estimated 
the national average hypothetical tax rate to be 26% 
of earnings, but this varied by 10 percentage points 
between the richest and poorest areas, demonstrating 
the way in which some districts subsidise others through 
fiscal transfers. 
The results show consistently that people in areas with 
the lowest LE spend more years, on average, in poor 
health than areas with higher LE. Areas with the lowest 
WLE also have the lowest HLE, meaning that poor 
health is likely to be the biggest obstacle to working 
longer. Such areas enjoy far less time spent in healthy 
retirement than healthier districts, and they face more 
health challenges and income deprivation in later years. 
Healthier areas gain from more social capital – for 
instance for the purposes of volunteering or caring for 
relatives – as well as offering inhabitants the flexibility to 
work up to and beyond the SPA.11 Areas with fewer years 
spent in good health show more people needing social 
care as well as healthcare and financial support. This 
exacerbates labour shortages in the care sector.
Overall, the analysis suggests that good health is a 
necessary (although not sufficient) condition for 
reducing inequality. We show that improvements in 
HLE translate into longer working lives and also longer 
life expectancy. A one-year increase in HLE would lead 
to an approximate 3.4-month increase in WLE and a 
4.5-month increase in LE. The increase in HLE should 
result in more retirement years spent in good health, a 
smaller gap between HLE and LE and hence reduced 
demand for health and social care. 
However, the impact on inequality does not change pro 
rata. Therefore, more targeted methods are needed to 
address the most left behind areas. Still, there would be 
more healthy retirees than previously, which would be 
better for the economy and contribute to other beneficial 
activities such as volunteering and caring.  
To address the potentially negative link between an 
ageing population and economic sustainability three 
actions are needed: 
11  Mayhew, L. D. 2020.On the Postponement of Increases in State Pension 
Age through Health Improvement and Active Ageing.  Appl. Spatial 
Analysis. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12061-020-09359-y
11 Mayhew, L. D. 2020.On the Postponement of Increases in State Pension Age through Health Improvement and Active Ageing.  Appl. Spatial Analysis. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12061-020-09359-y
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•	 Encourage (and enable) more people to work for 
longer. An increase in the SPA could achieve this but 
a precondition is that health must improve, not just 
LE. If the SPA increases and health is unchanged, 
any saving will be diluted by the increased costs of 
health and welfare.12 
•	 Some of the extra years spent in good health need to 
be translated into productive work, but this does not 
have to mean working in arduous occupations or full 
time. The effects would be beneficial for both GDP 
and the tax take.
•	 Lift historically low levels of productivity in the 
UK, as compared with international competitors, by 
increasing output per worker through investment 
in modern production methods, skills training and 
technical innovation – all of which would translate 
into higher earnings. 
Further implications and 
prospects
Higher returns on investment through profits, dividends 
and rents would also boost GDP, so the country as a 
whole would be better off. This would have the effect 
of reducing tax rates but not necessarily inequality. That 
would depend on how the extra output is distributed 
between areas and, by extension, socio-economically. For 
example, automation could dispense with some labour 
altogether. Without any changes in WLE, HLE and LE 
nationally and locally, the effect would tend to be to 
concentrate wealth rather than disperse it. The challenge 
is, therefore, to blend these different levers to optimal 
effect to achieve the greatest prosperity for the greatest 
number.
How is it possible that areas with the lowest LE could 
rise to the level of the highest? We have noted that for 
HLE to increase by five years by 2035 (which is the 
government target), life expectancy would rise by about 
two years to 81.7 years – a level currently reached in 
12 
only 5% of English districts. In some other countries 
there is evidence of progress, but not on this scale. Of 
the G20 countries, only South Korea, India and Russia 
improved their HLE by more than five years between 
2000 and 2015 – and all started from a much lower 
base. In the UK, the increase was only 2.9 years and 
in Japan, the country with the world’s highest HLE, 
it was 2.3 years.13 Closing the gap will be a long-term 
process requiring locally targeted, as well as universal, 
adjustments in policies. 
What are the immediate prospects? Improvements in life 
expectancy since 2010 have faltered for various reasons 
and it has proved challenging to turn this around. The 
data on the full impact of Covid-19 on LE, HLE and 
WLE will not be available for a year or two, but we 
should expect falls in LE. We know from other research 
that there is a strong relationship between health and 
deprivation in the UK and that the health gap between 
the richest and poorest is widening.14 We also know 
there are limitations on how long people can be expected 
to work, as well as affordability problems (from a public 
spending point of view) regarding the future of the state 
pension.15 The achievement of the government’s five-year 
health improvement target depends on unprecedented 
progress being made in HLE. 
While our research has been preliminary, its 
distinguishing feature is to link human capital and 
health directly to economic output. It ties together 
variables that are generally reported in silos. Further 
research is needed to add local detail – for example, in 
terms of earnings, gender and the health benefits of 
education. GDP per head could also be disaggregated 
using local GDP and the latest demographic data. And, 
of course, the paper has concentrated on England, and 
the research could be extended to the whole of the UK.
We urge the new Office for Health Promotion to 
support joined-up research of this kind by working with 
bodies promoting productivity improvements and other 
parts of the ‘levelling up’ agenda. 
13   Health matters: Why we must commit to delivering prevention in an 
ageing world. 2021. International Longevity Centre (ILC-UK)  https://
ilcuk.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/ILC-HEALTH-MATTERS-
RPT.pdf )
14  Mayhew, L.D., G. Harper, G. and A.M. Villegas (2020). Ibid, p3. 
15  Mayhew, L.D (2018). Ibid, p6.
13 Health matters: Why we must commit to delivering prevention in an ageing world. 2021. International Longevity Centre (ILC-UK)  https://ilcuk.org.uk/
wp-content/uploads/2021/02/ILC-HEALTH-MATTERS-RPT.pdf )
14 Mayhew, L.D., G. Harper, G. and A.M. Villegas (2020). Ibid, p3. 
15 Mayhew, L.D (2018). Ibid, p6.
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Appendix: English districts coded according to life, health and work expectancy  
(H = high; M= medium; L=low)
No District code No District code
1 Barking and Dagenham LLM 39 East Riding of Yorkshire MMM
2 Barnet HHM 40 East Sussex MMM
3 Barnsley LLM 41 Enfield MHM
4 Bath and North East Somerset HMM 42 Essex MHH
5 Bedford MHH 43 Gateshead LLM
6 Bexley MHH 44 Gloucestershire MHH
7 Birmingham LLL 45 Greenwich MMM
8 Blackburn with Darwen LLL 46 Hackney MLL
9 Blackpool LLL 47 Halton LMM
10 Bolton MMM 48 Hammersmith and Fulham MMM
11 Bournemouth MML 49 Hampshire HHH
12 Bracknell Forest HHH 50 Haringey MMM
13 Bradford LMM 51 Harrow HHH
14 Brent MMM 52 Hartlepool LLL
15 Brighton and Hove MML 53 Havering MHM
16 Bristol, City of MLM 54 Herefordshire, County of HHM
17 Bromley HHH 55 Hertfordshire HMH
18 Buckinghamshire HHH 56 Hillingdon HHH
19 Bury LMM 57 Hounslow MMH
20 Calderdale MMM 58 Isle of Wight MML
21 Cambridgeshire HHH 59 Islington MMM
22 Camden HML 60 Kensington and Chelsea HHL
23 Central Bedfordshire HMH 61 Kent MMM
24 Cheshire East MHM 62 Kingston upon Hull, City of LLL
25 Cheshire West and Chester MHM 63 Kingston upon Thames HHM
26 Cornwall MMM 64 Kirklees MML
27 County Durham MLL 65 Knowsley LLL
28 Coventry MML 66 Lambeth MLH
29 Croydon HMM 67 Lancashire MML
30 Cumbria MMM 68 Leeds MMM
31 Darlington LMM 69 Leicester LLL
32 Derby LMH 70 Leicestershire HMM
33 Derbyshire MMM 71 Lewisham MMM
34 Devon MMM 72 Lincolnshire MMH
35 Doncaster LLM 73 Liverpool LLL
36 Dorset HHH 74 Luton MMM
37 Dudley MMM 75 Manchester LLL
38 Ealing HMH 76 Medway MMM
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No District code No District code
77 Merton HMH 114 South Tyneside LLM
78 Middlesbrough LLL 115 Southampton MMM
79 Milton Keynes MMM 116 Southend-on-Sea MMM
80 Newcastle upon Tyne LLL 117 Southwark MMM
81 Newham MMM 118 St. Helens LLL
82 Norfolk MMM 119 Staffordshire MMM
83 North East Lincolnshire LMM 120 Stockport MMH
84 North Lincolnshire MML 121 Stockton-on-Tees MMM
85 North Somerset HHM 122 Stoke-on-Trent LML
86 North Tyneside LMM 123 Suffolk HMM
87 North Yorkshire HHM 124 Sunderland LLL
88 Northamptonshire MHH 125 Surrey HHM
89 Northumberland MMM 126 Sutton HMH
90 Nottingham LLL 127 Swindon MMH
91 Nottinghamshire MML 128 Tameside LLL
92 Oldham LML 129 Telford and Wrekin MLM
93 Oxfordshire HHH 130 Thurrock MMM
94 Peterborough MMM 131 Torbay MMM
95 Plymouth MLM 132 Tower Hamlets MLH
96 Poole HHM 133 Trafford MMH
97 Portsmouth LML 134 Wakefield LLM
98 Reading MHM 135 Walsall LLL
99 Redbridge HMM 136 Waltham Forest MLM
100 Redcar and Cleveland MLL 137 Wandsworth MMH
101 Richmond upon Thames HHM 138 Warrington MHH
102 Rochdale LLL 139 Warwickshire MHM
103 Rotherham MLM 140 West Berkshire HHH
104 Rutland HHH 141 West Sussex HMM
105 Salford LLM 142 Westminster HML
106 Sandwell LLM 143 Wigan LLM
107 Sefton MML 144 Wiltshire HMH
108 Sheffield MLM 145 Windsor and Maidenhead HHH
109 Shropshire MMH 146 Wirral LML
110 Slough MMH 147 Wokingham HHH
111 Solihull HML 148 Wolverhampton LLL
112 Somerset MHH 149 Worcestershire MHM
113 South Gloucestershire HHH 150 York MHM
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